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Professor Burr is never dull. Nor does he follow the frequent practice of
piling up facts and footnotes to obscure the failure to have thought through
what theyall mean. He has the rare capacity to brush the welter of secondary
details and suggestions aside and seek out the fundamental issues and
assumptions of his science. His present book is typical. Except for a
passing reference to Dr. Wilder Penfield, not a single authority is mentioned
nor a solitary scientific paper designated. Taking for granted a lifetime of
experimental work in embryology, neural anatomy and the electrical
properties of plants and animals, he here gives his summing up.
Inevitably the result of such a scientific procedure and mentality is
philosophy-in this case a philosophy not merely of biological science
generally, but also of human nature in particular, including its emotive,
logical and even religious, as well as its secularly moral and psychiatrical
manifestations. Yes!, many psychiatrists to the contrary notwithstanding,
the logical and the theoretically rational in addition to the emotional have
to be included.
There is no science except as facts are reported in the words of indicative
sentences. Words are treacherous things when statements in terms of
them are taken naively as a report of the facts. Such is the case because
the words of contemporary and ordinary scientific language acquire their
meaning in various ways, referring to quite different worlds of discourse.
When words of different worlds of discourse are put in the same sentence,
nonsense results, such as, "Electrons are pink," "Squareness is yellow,"
or "Pain is in the cortex."
The science whose business it is to analyze the language of any subject
and designate the different sources and ways in which its mathematical and
ordinary symbols get their meaning is epistemology. This is why mathe-
matical physicists recently have had to become epistemological philosophers
in order to avoid falling into very serious errors about what Einstein's
Theories of Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and the Michelson-Morley
and other experiments mean. This also is why Einstein tells us that
science without epistemology is unthinkable. To this he would add logic
since his physics is mathematical and every mathematical proof or calcula-
tion expresses an implicitly built-in logic.
As Dr. Burr realizes, all healthy human beings calculate, at least
occasionally, and in an elementary way; also, even calculating machines
are impossible except as a logic is built into them. Similarly, the human
nervous system has its built-in logic as well as its cortically discovered
alternative "programmed-in" logics and fallacious inferences. In fact, the
investigation of the logical properties of neural nets in living creatures and
the logic of calculating machines have gone forward together, the one
influencing the other. This is why Dr. Burr includes these matters in
his final summing up of life's meaning.
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But calculating machines are completely explicable in terms of the
principle of mechanical causality (with negative feedback over the target)
of inorganic science. For this and other reasons, he is right when he
affirms that a philosophy of biology and medicine cannot escape being a
philosophy of inorganic nature also, with the identities and differences
between inorganic and living things explicated within a single set of
theoretical assumptions.
He sees that a dualistic scientific philosophy of physical-chemical
scientific objects and nonempirically confirmable, disembodied substantial
minds or souls will not do. It fails for two reasons: First, as he indicates,
it leaves the relation between the naturalistic nervous system and im-
mediately experienced emotions and ideas a mystery, and this leaves
psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine in the same state. Second, as he is
aware, and the present reviewer has shown in Chapters 3 and 4 of
Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics, the dualistic philosophy
is the result of reifying, into substances, words belonging to the afore-
mentioned different worlds of discourse and then attempting to put them
in causal interaction with one another as if they belonged to a single
world of discourse. As noted above, the result of such epistemologically
illiterate "science" or "philosophy" is always nonsense. Hence the mystery
of the traditional dualism and its psuedo "mind-body problem." Hence
also the many questionable causal inferences in which, due to their
epistemologically unanalyzed language, so many purportedly analytic
psychiatrists today indulge.
In this connection, Dr. Burr's directness of style and use of pithy short
sentences is subject to one danger unless read with some care. The trouble
with ordinary language is that, unless critically examined to determine
from the context the linguistic world of discourse which is meant, it
carries with it all the connotations of the old scientific and philosophical
mind-body dualism. Also the syntax of ordinary language, and especially
its short, concise sentences, is two-termed relational. More specifically, it
joins a property to a subject-term or thing by the copula is. This inevitably
causes the uncritical reader to think about the facts of any subject matter
in terms of localized entities and their properties. But the scientific objects
of mathematical physics are functions of many variables and hence are many-
termed relational entities. Similarly, any living organism is a many-termed
relational unity. Moreover, the properties of living organisms which one
directly observes belong to a directly inspectable, radically empirical
world of discourse; whereas the scientific objects of physiological chemistry
and biophysics are syntactical many-termed relational constructs belonging
to a directly unobservable, logically realistic world of discourse. When,
therefore, vivid, incisive, ordinary prose leads the reader to unconsciously
think in terms of directly sensed properties qualifying physical-chemical
objects or neurophysiological nets, the result again is neither science nor
scientific philosophy but nonsense.
This does not mean that because Dr. Burr uses such prose his theory
or any part of it is nonsense. Quite the contrary. It does mean, however,
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that philosophers of science, trained in the linguistic analytic methods for
distinguishing different epistemological worlds of discourse, must expand
many of Dr. Burr's short sentences, thereby separating their directly in-
spected, radically empirical meaning and usage from their many-termed
relational, logically realistic and constructed usage and then epistemically
correlating the two worlds of discourse. Thanks to the carrying through of
the linguistic and epistemological analysis of the language of mathematical
physics, we now know how to do this. Since his rejection of dualism re-
quires him to make his theory of biology one that is in the discourse of
the other natural sciences, this means that his philosophy of biology can be
put in such linguistically and epistemologically impeccable form. Of this
he is well aware.
These considerations suggest that the most important scientific task
of contemporary biology and medicine may well be the application of
the know-how of competent philosophical analysts of mathematical physics
to the epistemological and methodological clarification of the language and
the diagnostic methods of psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine.
Dr. Burr's book also corrects an erroneous inference that was made
from the shortcomings of some of the theoretical and philosophical con-
clusions drawn by the ablest reflective experimental biologists of the first
quarter of this century. This error occurred when their successors of the
present elder generation jumped to the non sequitur that because the
biological theories and philosophies of Hans Driesch, J. S. Haldane and
Jacques Loeb exhibited certain inadequacies, therefore the attempt at a
biological theory and philosopher was misguided. The result, as Dr. Burr
indicates, was a sequence of inadequate theories which found "the key
to life" in one or another localized chemical compound. From this sequence
of errors a more careful reading of the biological giants of the 1920's
could have saved one, as it did in the case of Dr. Burr. Driesch, Haldane,
Loeb and L. J. Henderson presented experimental evidence and over-all
theoretical analyses of this evidence which made it unequivocally clear
that what makes living creatures different from inorganic natural objects
is not the elemental scientific objects out of which they are made, but
the way in which these entities are put together. Consequently the primary
problem of biological theory and experimentation centers in the relatedness
rather than merely the entities related. In short it is the problem of
organization. Moreover, the giants showed by morphological transplanta-
tion experiments or physiological chemical experiments and theoretical
analyses that the relatedness determines the final effect produced by any
chemical compound as much as if not more than the compound determines
the organization.
Forthwith it becomes evident that one does not have an adequate theory
of how any newly discovered and synthesized compound behaves function-
ally except as one has an independent theory confirmed by experiment
of the relatedness or organization into which the compound enters as one
of its many physicochemical terms.
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Learning this lesson from the giants of the first quarter of this century,
Dr. Burr saw that an adequate science of biology and medicine must have
a theory and method for directly investigating the morphological relatedness
of the scientific entities in living things as well as the traditional method
for determining the localized entities themselves. More specifically, because
he saw the organization of the entities to be the central problem, he turned
(1) to those theoretical concepts in the inorganic sciences which make
vectoral, directional factors and relational field factors primary. Then,
guided by such theoretical concepts, he (2) devised experimental techniques
and apparatus which would permit him to investigate the over-all mor-
phological relatedness in living creatures with both experimental and
theoretical directness. The electrodynamic field physics theory of life
resulted from (1); the construction of electrodes and an electromagnetic
apparatus for measuring changing potential differences of plants and animals
was the product of (2). These historical details are given here because they
show that the theoretical and experimental evidence which lies behind
the scientific philosophy of this book is by no means negligible.
It takes Dr. Burr considerable time in his first two chapters to get
warmed up to what he wants to say and how best to put it. Consequently,
the first part of his exposition is somewhat repetitious. Also the mor-
phological, neurophysiological and electromagnetic reasons for some of his
repeated statements are not then shown. This slowness of take-off should
not deter the reader. The evidence accumulates later.
The early chapters may also raise one apparently devastating question:
If, as he concludes, man is subject to the laws of nature, how can anyone
hold and behave according to beliefs which are out of accord with those
laws, as he also affirms they do?
Before an unreformed dualist concludes that this question disposes of
Dr. Burr's naturalistic biological and moral philosophy, one must read
his answers in later chapters. They have to do with the correlation of
introspective psychological and neurophysiological factors, information
theory, the "imaginative" areas of the cortex, the anatomical relation be-
tween cortex and thalmus and the identification of the good in the human-
ities with the true with respect to natural knowledge. Inevitably the
meaning of free will and religion in the face of mechanical natural laws has
to be faced. But these are matters which the reader will want to get
directly from this scientifically informed and forthright book.
F. S. C. NORTHROP
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